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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No- 920463-CA

v.
Priority No. 2

JULIE HARMON,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant Julie Harmon appeals her conviction for
unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third degree
felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp.
1992), entered by the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake
County, Utah, the Honorable Anne M. Stirba, presiding.

This

Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f)
(Supp. 1992).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
For reasons explained in the body of this brief, the
State addresses the issues presented by defendant in reverse
order, as follows:
1.

Did the trial court correctly rule that defendant's

consent to a police search of her home was freely and voluntarily
given?

Furtherf was her consent sufficiently "attenuated- from

possible earlier police misconduct, such that the fruits of the
home search were not subject to the exclusionary rule?

The Utah

Supreme Court has held that a trial court's ruling of voluntary
consent, and a ruling on whether such consent is "attenuated"
from prior illegal police conduct, once the underlying facts are
established, are both questions of law, reviewed without
deference to the trial court.

State v. Thurman, No. 910494, slip

op. at 17-21 (Utah Jan. 7, 1993).
2.

Did the trial court correctly rule that a police

officer's arrest of defendant for the offense of driving under a
suspended license was not an improper "pretext" arrest?

Because

defendant does not challenge the accuracy of the trial court's
fact findings, this question may legitimately be treated as one
of law, reviewed without deference to the trial court.

See State

v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1044-50 (Utah App.), cert, granted, No.
920319 (Utah Oct. 28, 1992).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
and Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution are
practically identical in their language.

The former provision

reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Utah Code Ann. S 41-1-17 (1988), in effect at the time
of the events in question here, provided in pertinent part:
2

[P]eace officers, state patrolmen, and others
duly authorized by the [motor vehicle] department
or by law shall have power and it shall be their
duty:
(a) To enforce the provisions of this act and
of all other laws regulating the registration or
operation of vehicles or the use of the highways,
(b) To make arrests upon view and without
warrant for any violation committed in their
presence of any of the provisions of this act or
other law regulating the operation of vehicles or
the use of the highways.
. . .

Article V, section 1 of the Utah Constitution reads:
The powers of the government of the State of
Utah shall be divided into three distinct
departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and
the Judicial; and no person charged with the
exercise of powers properly belonging to one of
these departments, shall exercise any functions
appertaining to either of the others, except in
cases herein expressly directed or permitted.
Other constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules pertinent to
the resolution of this appeal will be contained in the body of
this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
As set forth in defendant's opening brief, this case
involves a conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled
substance.

The conviction was entered upon defendant's guilty

plea, whereupon another, lesser charge was dismissed (R. 95-102).
Defendant's plea was conditional, under State v. Serv, 758 P.2d
735 (Utah App. 1988), reserving the right to appeal the denial of
her pretrial motion to suppress evidence (R. 95).

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The trial court entered detailed findings of fact and
conclusions of law, supporting its denial of defendant's motion
to suppress evidence (R. 104-108, copied in Opening Br. of
Appellant, Appendix 2).

In a signed memorandum decision (R. 79-

91, also copied .id.), the court found that defendant was not a
credible witness at the motion hearing, and consistently credited
the involved law officer's testimony over that of defendant (R.
88-90).

Defendant does not argue that any of those findings are

clearly erroneous.

Thus the State's fact recitation closely

tracks the trial court's findings, adding supporting citations to
the transcript of the motion to suppress hearing (R. 196-309),
and to the transcript of the preliminary hearing (R. 311-65,
admitted into the record at R. 126-27), as follows:
On November 19, 1991, Detective Russo of the Metro
Narcotics task force received an informant's tip that defendant
was distributing narcotics from a single-family home in west Salt
Lake County (R. 200-01, 313) (the informant is described at R.
343-44).

That evening, Russo went to the named address, where he

encountered defendant as she was backing her car out of the
driveway.

Russo told defendant about the narcotics trafficking

report, and asked if he could search her home (R. 202-03, 315-16,
349).

Defendant refused, stating that she was leaving to visit

her father, who had recently suffered a heart attack; she then
drove away (R. 203, 317, 349, 351).

4

Remaining by the home, Russo radioed to check on the
status of defendant's driver's license, and was informed that her
license was suspended (R. 204, 317, 350-51).

Meanwhile,

defendant drove around the block twice, passing the home (id..; R.
305).

Russo obtained assistance from a marked patrol officer,

and stopped defendant nearby (R. 204-05, 317).
Russo arrested defendant for driving on a suspended
license (R. 205, 317, 352). Although assigned as a narcotics
officer, Russo issued occasional traffic citations (R. 244-45).
He had previously made several dozen stops of other persons for
driving under suspension; of that number, he had effected full
custodial arrests approximately a dozen times (R. 205-06, 233).
The decision whether to make a custodial arrest for driving under
suspension was, in practice, a matter of officer discretion (R.
106, 235).
Incident to this arrest, Russo searched defendant's
purse and found controlled substances, apparently prescription
drug pills that were mislabelled or not prescribed to defendant
(R. 206-07, 317-18).x

Russo gave defendant "Miranda" warnings,

put her into his car, and began driving to jail.

En route,

defendant admitted that she had been afraid to let Russo into her
*Russo testified that he "initiated a search and seizure
arrest" (R. 206). However, that statement came on the heels of
Russo's statement that he had already arrested defendant (R. 205).
Also, at the preliminary hearing, Russo testified that upon
arresting defendant, he conducted a "search of her purse instant to
that arrest" (R. 317). Thus Russo's testimony does not necessarily
show that he arrested defendant in order to search her; it equally
suggests that Russo merely was less than ideally articulate in
describing his action.
5

home, because she had sold drugs in the past, and still had
paraphernalia in the home (R. 207, 328). She told Russo that if
he would drive her back home, she would let him inside to
retrieve those items (R. 208, 251).
Defendant offered to sign a consent form, allowing
Russo to search her home (R. 209). Russo promised her no benefit
in return for her consent, and told her that she would probably
go to jail anyway (R. 210, 328-29, 354-56).

He further told

defendant that he wished to avoid any appearance of using
coercion to obtain her consent, and that he would simply apply
for a search warrant based upon the information he already had
(R. 208-09, 328-29).

Nevertheless, defendant again said that she

would consent, and even "insisted" upon returning to her home to
search it (R. 209-10, 328-29, 356). Summoning assistance, Russo
drove back to defendant's home (R. 209-11).
Arriving at the home, Russo "Mirandized" defendant
again.

Defendant signed a written form consenting to a search of

her home (R. 211-12, 330, 355-56).

The consent form (State's

Exhibit 1, reproduced at Appendix 3 to Br. of Appellant) stated
that defendant had "been informed of my rights per Miranda not to
have a search made of the premises, hereinafter mentioned,
without a search warrant, [andJ of my right to refuse consent to
such a search . . .."

It further specified that the search was

for the purpose of a narcotics investigation (id.).
After defendant signed the consent form, Russo became
concerned about defendant's dog, inside the home; he told
6

defendant that he would have to shoot the dog if it attacked the
searching officers (R. 212, 239-40, 247, 355). Defendant was
allowed into the home ahead of the officers, and she removed the
dog to the back yard.

Thus the officers never actually

endangered the dog (R. 212-13, 248).
Russo and the assisting officers then performed the
home search, with defendant's cooperation (R. 213-14, 257-58).
Defendant herself retrieved various items of drug paraphernalia
and illegal drugs from beneath her living room sofa, and turned
them over to the officers (R. 213-14, 248, 332). The fruits of
the home search included methamphetamine, marijuana, and
paraphernalia used for "cutting" drugs (R. 253, 263-65, 333).
After the search, Russo decided against taking
defendant directly to jail (R. 214). Nor did he cite defendant
for driving under suspension (R. 357). Instead, Russo left her
at home, with instructions to call him the following morning
regarding the contemplated drug charges (R. 214-15).

Defendant

was formally arrested about two weeks later (R. 5, 14).
Trial Court Disposition
Defendant was charged by information with three
controlled substance violations (R. 6-8). Count Three dealt with
the prescription narcotics found in defendant's purse incident to
her arrest (R. 8, 318-25); that charge, however, was dismissed
following the preliminary hearing (R. 7, 365). Count Two was
misdemeanor-level marijuana possession; that charge was dismissed
pursuant to defendant's plea bargain (R. 7, 98, 102). Defendant
7

conditionally pleaded guilty only to Count One, felony-level
possession of methamphetamine (R. 6, 95). That drug, again, had
been recovered during the home search.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court need not reach the unsettled "pretext" issue
here, for this case can be resolved without deciding whether
defendant's arrest was "pretextual."

Instead, this Court can

simply examine whether defendant's consent to search her home was
voluntary, and not arrived at through exploitation of the arrest.
The record here demonstrates that defendant's consent was valid
under this "attenuation" test.

She was not forced to consent,

and knew of her right to refuse consent.

Even if the arrest

might be deemed improper, it was not "flagrantly" so, given that
it was authorized by statute, and took place in advance of this
Court's explanation of "pretext" doctrine.

Further, defendant

actively volunteered her search consent to Detective Russo,
breaking the causal connection between the arrest and the
consent.

Thus the fruits of the consent search were properly

admitted into evidence.
If pretext analysis is undertaken, Detective Russo's
subjective "motivation" for arresting defendant was irrelevant
under controlling law.

Next, the offense of driving under

suspension, the assigned reason for defendant's arrest, is not a
"minor" offense.

It is a willfully-committed, serious offense

for which defendant should have been arrested; accordingly,
pretext analysis is inappropriate.
8

Finally, even though Russo

did not "usually" arrest persons caught driving under suspension,
such arrests were not so uncommon that a reasonable officer would
have necessarily decided to not arrest defendant.
Pretext doctrine may have a legitimate, limited place
in search and seizure law regarding arrests.

However, the same

criticisms apply to the doctrine as regards both temporary
detentions and arrests.

In both contexts, pretext doctrine is

unnecessary, confusing, and ultimately subjective in application,
adequately guiding neither police officers nor reviewing courts.
Here the doctrine also violates Utah's constitutional separationof-powers provision.

If not abandoned altogether, the doctrine

should be restricted in its application only to arrests that are
grossly out of line with usual police practice.
ARGUMENT
Introduction
The Utah Supreme Court has granted certiorari review of
State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040 (Utah App.), cert, granted, No.
920319 (Utah Oct. 28, 1992), wherein this Court adopted "pretext
doctrine" as a constitutional principle.

On certiorari, the

State will argue that pretext doctrine has no legitimate place in
search and seizure law, at least in the context of non-arrest,
temporary detentions.

The extent to which the supreme court's

resolution of this question will also affect pretext doctrine in
the arrest context, presented here, cannot be predicted.
It seems prudent to avoid a potential conflict with the
supreme court's pending decision of the "pretext" question.

9

Further, "judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching
constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding
them."

State v. Thurman, No. 910494, slip op. at 7 (Utah Jan. 7,

1993) (quotation and citation omitted).
reach the "pretext" issue here.

There is no need to

Instead, following the supreme

court's lead in Thurman, slip op. at 7, 23, the question of
whether the items seized from defendant's home were properly
admitted into evidence against her can be answered through
"attenuation" analysis, without addressing the constitutional
propriety of her arrest.
Therefore, the State addresses the issues presented by
defendant in reverse order:

First, the State will show that

defendant's consent to her home search was both voluntary and not
achieved by exploitation of her arrest, such that the fruits of
that search were properly admitted into evidence even if the
arrest was improper.

Then the "pretext" question will be

addressed, and pretext analysis will be shown not to be satisfied
here.

Finally, the State will review the problems posed by

pretext doctrine, arguing that it should be abandoned or at least
greatly restricted in its application.

10

POINT ONE
REGARDLESS OF ANY PROBLEM WITH HER ARREST,
DEFENDANT'S SUBSEQUENT CONSENT TO THE HOME
SEARCH WAS BOTH VOLUNTARY AND ATTENUATED FROM
THE ARREST, SUCH THAT THE FRUITS OF THAT
SEARCH ARE ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE.
A.

Only the Home Search is in Issue.
As a preliminary matter, the scope of this appeal must

be understood.

Defendant's plea-supported conviction is only for

possession of methamphetamine—contraband that was found upon the
search of her home.

The charge of unlawful possession of

prescription medications, arising from the earlier, incident-toarrest search of defendant's purse, was dismissed following the
preliminary hearing (R. 7, 365).
Therefore, the question of the propriety of the search
conducted incident to defendant's arrest has no direct bearing
upon the parties' respective rights regarding defendant's
conviction.

Therefore, the question is moot, see Burkett v.

Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989), and under Rule 37, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure (mootness), this Court ought not to
review it.
Because the search incident to defendant's arrest is a
moot question, the State's acknowledgment that pretext doctrine
may have a place in the arrest context (Opening Br. of Appellant
at 11 n.2) is less significant to this case than it might
otherwise be.

This is because any possible misuse of misdemeanor

arrest power here did not directly yield evidence that might be

11

subject to the exclusionary rule under search and seizure law.
Only the subsequent home search yielded such evidence.
B.

The Contraband in Defendant's Home was Seized
Pursuant to Consent that was Both Voluntary and
Not Obtained by Exploitation of her Arrest.
In State v. Thurman, No. 910494 (Utah Jan. 7, 1993),

the Utah Supreme Court clarified and reaffirmed the place of
"attenuation" analysis, earlier set forth in State v. Arroyo, 796
P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), in search and seizure law.

Under that

analysis, evidence seized pursuant to a consensual search is
admissible, even if the consent follows questionable or illegal
police conduct, if two conditions are met:
must be voluntary, that is, not coerced.

First, the consent

Second, the consent

must not be obtained by exploitation of the earlier police
conduct.

Thurman, slip op. at 7; accord State v. Robinson, 797

P.2d 431, 437 & n.7 (Utah App. 1990).

The supreme court held

that both conditions present questions of law that, once the
underlying facts are established, are reviewed without deference
to trial court rulings.

Thurman, slip op. at 21.2

Thurman was decided only under the fourth amendment.
Slip op. at 3 n.4.

On appeal, defendant does not argue that

attenuation analysis should proceed differently under Article I,
section 14 of the Utah Constitution than it does under the fourth
amendment (Opening Br. of Appellant at 25-31).
2

Accordingly, the

Contra Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S.
Ct. 2041, 2047-48 (1973) ("the question whether a consent to a
search was in fact 'voluntary' or was the product of duress or
coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of all the circumstances").
12

State limits its attenuation analysis to fourth amendment law, as
set forth in Thurman and other cases applying the analysis, see
id.

Under that analysis, both conditions for attenuated search

consent are satisfied here.
1. Voluntary Consent.
Satisfaction of the voluntariness condition is
determined "from the totality of all the circumstances"
surrounding the search consent.

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412

U.S. 218, 227, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2048 (1973); accord Robinson, 797
P.2d at 437 & n.7.

Defendant identifies the pertinent factors

for reviewing a voluntariness determination, set forth in State
v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980), and in State v.
Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah App. 1990).

She correctly notes that

the burden is upon the State to satisfy the Whittenback and Webb
standards in the trial court.

Because the trial court

effectively ruled that the State met that obligation, the burden
of persuasion, on appeal, now rests with defendant.

She has not

carried her burden.
In Webb, this Court listed three factors for
determining voluntary search consent:
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony
that the consent was "unequivocal and specific"
and "freely and intelligently given";
(2) the government must prove consent was given
without duress or coercion, express or implied;
and
(3) the courts indulge every reasonable
presumption against the waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and there must be convincing
evidence that such rights were waived.
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790 P.2d at 82 (quotations and citations omitted).

The third

factor actually describes the State's trial court burden, and
otherwise repeats the first factor, regarding "clear" and
"specific" evidence supporting voluntariness.

The State

therefore addresses the first and third Webb factors together.
Defendant complains that the written consent form that
she signed is not clear and specific, but "garbled" (Opening Br.
of Appellant at 29).

However, the form states that defendant was

informed of her "right not to have a search made of the premises,
hereinafter mentioned, without a Search Warrant," and of her
"right to refuse to consent to such a search" (Appendix 3,
Opening Br. of Appellant).

This is, nearly verbatim, the consent

form language quoted by the Utah Supreme Court in Thurman, slip
op. at 24, without criticism.

Imparted here in three clear,

typewritten lines, it is difficult to imagine how any Englishspeaking adult could fail to grasp its meaning.
Besides the signed consent form, Detective Russo's
testimony—both presumably and explicitly credited over that of
defendant (R. 88-90), ££. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787
(Utah 1991)—revealed that defendant not only offered her consent
to the home search, but that she repeatedly and even insistently
did so (R. 209-10, 328-29, 356). Further, she did this on the
heels of her "Miranda" warnings, admonishing her to remain silent
or risk legal peril in speaking (R. 207, 211-12).

Along with the

signed consent form, a more specific and clear expression of
search consent can scarcely be imagined.
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The remaining Webb factor focuses on the question of
duress or police coercion in obtaining a consent.

The pertinent

subfactors are:
(1) the absence of
by the officers;
(2) the absence of
officers;
(3) a mere request
(4) cooperation by
(5) the absence of
of the officer•

a claim of authority to search
an exhibition of force by the
to search;
[the subject]; and
deception or trick on the part

Whittenback, 621 P.2d at 106.
Without clear record citation, and apparently relying
upon her own, discredited testimony, defendant seems to argue
that Detective Russo falsely claimed that he could easily obtain
a search warrant, such that the first and fifth Whittenback
subfactors were not satisfied (Br. of Appellant at 8, 29-31).

In

fact, Russo expressed no view toward defendant regarding whether
a search warrant might be obtained when he first encountered her
in her driveway and asked for search consent (R. 226-27).

He

told her that he would need either a warrant, or defendant's
consent—which she could refuse, to search the home (R. 350).
Further, Russo squarely denied even hinting, after
defendant's arrest, that she could avoid going to jail if she
consented to a search her home (R. 237-38, 354). Indeed, he
initially refused defendant's proffered consent, voicing concern
about seeming to coerce her, stating that he would prefer to
apply for a warrant, and telling defendant that she would receive
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no favor in return for her consent (R. 208-10).

This hardly

amounts to trickery or false authority under Whittenback.3
Nor did defendant succumb to an improper "exhibition of
force" in giving her search consent.

She acknowledged this in

the written consent form, and no other facts compel a contrary
conclusion.

The facts that defendant was under arrest and

handcuffed when she proffered the consent, for example, do not
establish coercion under Whittenback.
1268, 1273-74 (Utah App. 1990).

State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d

Any threat to defendant's dog

was irrelevant, for the trial court explicitly found that mention
of shooting the animal was made only after defendant had already
given the consent (R. 106, 239). Nor does the possible presence
of four police officers, when defendant was stopped for driving
under suspension, necessarily constitute a coercive show of
force.

Cf:. Bobo, 803 P. 2d at 1270-71 (home entry by at least

four officers; search consent held voluntary).
Nor does the officer conduct in this case approach that
condemned, through dictum, in Thurman.

There six officers

improperly broke into a home, weapons drawn, to serve a search
warrant, rousting the defendant naked from his bed, handcuffing
him, and bloodying his nose in the process.
21-22.

Thurman, slip op. at

Similarly, contrary to the situation in Robinson (quoted

in Opening Br. of Appellant at 31), defendant here was not
3

By the time defendant proffered her search consent to Russo,
she had, upon receiving "Miranda" warnings, already admitted her
history of drug dealing, and the presence of drug paraphernalia in
her home (R. 106, 207). Given this, it strongly appears that Russo
would have obtained a warrant, had he then sought one.
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subjected to a false claim of authority to detain her or conduct
a search; again, she was informed—repeatedly—of her right to
refuse search consent.

Thus no improper atmosphere of

intimidation was created by Russo.
In sum, defendant's assertion that "Russo was very
forceful," and that she "was very susceptible to his force"
(Opening Br. of Appellant at 30) cannot prevail.4

Instead, the

record amply supports a conclusion that there was even less than
a "mere request" for search consent under Whittenback once
defendant was arrested.

In spontaneously proffering her consent,

defendant also cooperated with Russo, under Whittenback.
Finally, Russo's use of a signed consent form, wherein
defendant acknowledged her right to refuse consent, supports
voluntariness in a manner that exceeds current constitutional
requirements.

See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229-33, 93 S. Ct. at

2048-50; Bobo, 803 P.2d at 1272-73.

Under all the circumstances,

then, the trial court's ruling that defendant voluntarily
consented to the home search was correct.
2.

No Exploitation of the Arrest.

Turning to the second condition for a valid consent
search, attenuated from questionable police conduct, it must be

^Defendant's claim that she was under duress because of her
father's recent heart attack (Opening Br. of Appellant at 28) was
also rejected by the trial court (R. 89). Defendant testified that
she did go visit her parents, who lived "just a few blocks" away,
after her first encounter with Russo (R. 281). When she arrived at
her parents' home, however, defendant learned that her father "had
just taken off with one of his friends to go for a ride, to go look
around, and go elk hunting" (R. 282).
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decided whether defendant's consent, although voluntary, was
achieved through exploitation of her arrest.
Thurman, three factors apply:

As guided by

These are the "purpose and

flagrancy" of the questionable police conduct, the "temporal
proximity" of the police conduct and the consent, and "the
presence of intervening circumstances" between the police conduct
and the consent.

Thurman, slip op. at 9; Arroyo, 796 P.2d at

690-91 n.4; Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04, 95 S. Ct.
2254, 2261-62 (1975).
Although the trial court made no "non-exploitation"
ruling, appellate courts often conduct this part of attenuation
analysis de novo, when the record permits it.

E.g.; Thurman,

slip op. at 23; State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 151 (Utah App.)
(citing Brown), petition for cert, pending. No. 910218 (Utah Oct.
4, 1991).

On the record of this case, it can readily be seen

that defendant's search consent was not achieved through
exploitation of her arrest.
Purpose and Flagrancy
Beginning with the "purpose and flagrancy" inquiry,
Detective Russo's encounter with defendant was initiated for the
purpose of investigating alleged narcotics trafficking.

Clearly,

Russo remained interested in investigating this offense
throughout the events in question here.

However, that purpose

did not negate the legitimacy of acting upon the new purpose that
arose when Russo discovered that defendant's driver's license was
suspended.

In fact, given the panoply of serious offenses that
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can lead to license suspension, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-2-127 &
-128 (Supp. 1992), it was not only prudent, but desirable, for
Russo to investigate the offense of driving under suspension.
Defendant seemingly complains that Detective Russo's
initial encounter with her, in her driveway, was somehow
improper.

Not so.

"An officer may approach a citizen at anytime

[sic] and pose questions so long as the citizen is not detained
against his [or her] will."

State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617

(Utah 1987) (per curiam) (citation omitted).

Russo clearly did

not overstep the limits of such a "level one" encounter, given
that defendant freely announced her intention to leave, and was
in fact allowed to do so (R. 105).
Defendant also distorts the nature of Russo's initial
questions.

She claims that Russo "accused her of being a rumored

'drug lord' and of having 'all the drugs in Columbia' in her
house" (Opening Br. of Appellant at 27). In fact, Russo's
approach was far less accusatory than defendant would have this
Court believe.

He simply commented upon the tip given to him by

his informant:

"I said the allegations suggested that she was

such a big dope dealer that all the drugs in Columbia would be in
her house" (R. 229, 348). This was hardly improper, let alone
flagrantly so, in the context of the "level one" encounter.
Defendant's arrest presents the only questionable
police conduct, assailed by her as "pretextual."
arrest cannot be deemed "flagrantly" improper.
was authorized by statute.

However, the
For one thing, it

That statute, Utah Code Ann. § 41-119

17 (1988), part of Utah's now-rewritten Motor Vehicle Act, stated
in pertinent part:
[P]eace officers, state patrolmen, and others
duly authorized by the [motor vehicle] department
or by law shall have power and it shall be their
duty:
(a) To enforce the provisions of this act and
of all other laws regulating the registration or
operation of vehicles or the use of the highways.
(b) To make arrests upon view and without
warrant for any violation committed in their
presence of any of the provisions of this act or
other law regulating the operation of vehicles or
the use of the highways.
Because section 41-1-17 stated that officers shall make
arrests for Motor Vehicle Act violations, Russo's discretion was
legislatively directed against merely citing defendant for
driving under suspension, a class C misdemeanor under Utah Code
Ann. § 41-2-136 (Supp. 1991).5

Accord State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d

1040, 1053 (Utah App. 1992) (Russon, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).

Section 41-1-17 does not appear to be

constitutionally infirm, and "[p]olice are charged to enforce
laws until and unless they are declared unconstitutional."
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 38, 99 S. Ct. 2627, 2632
(1979).

Suppression of evidence derived from officer adherence

to a statute serves no legitimate deterrent value. .Id. n.3;
3

In the rewritten Motor Vehicle Act, effective in 1992,
section 41-1-17 was replaced by Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-la-107, 41-3105(8)(a) (Supp. 1992).
Those provisions lack the mandatory
"shall" arrest language of section 41-1-17, applicable at the time
of defendant's 1991 arrest, except for certain offenses not
appearing to include driving under suspension. It thus appears
that the power to make an arrest for driving under suspension now
falls within the permissive "may" language of Utah Code Ann. § 777-2 (1990).
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Thurman, slip op. at 9-

Compare Sims, 808 P.2d at 144-45, 151

(suppression ordered where no statute authorized the challenged
police conduct).
Additionally, there is no sign that Russo exceeded the
scope of activities that normally attend a custodial arrest.

In

contrast, the United States Supreme Court found flagrant
misconduct in a gunpoint arrest, unsupported by probable cause,
that gave the "appearance of having been calculated to cause
surprise, fright, and confusion."
Ct. at 2262.

Brown, 422 U.S. at 605, 95 S.

Thus the arrestee's subsequent incriminating

statements were suppressed.

No similarly extreme conduct

attended this arrest, supported by undisputed probable cause to
believe that defendant was driving under suspension (R. 85).
Finally, it is significant that this 1991 arrest
predated this Court's Lopez opinion by over five months.

To the

extent that opinion may now guide police officers in avoiding
"pretextual" behavior, such guidance was lacking at the time of
this stop.

Having conducted this arrest in conformity with then-

existing statutory and case law, Detective Russo cannot be said
to have committed flagrant misconduct by failing to follow notyet-existent "pretext" guidelines.
Temporal Proximity
Turning to temporal proximity of the arrest and the
consent, this factor is less helpful in attenuation analysis
here.

See Sims, 808 P.2d at 151 & n.19 (time ranging from "brief

conversation" to two hours not significant for attenuation).
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The

time to travel some seventy to ninety blocks, in police custody
(Opening Br. of Appellant at 6), does not, by itself, appear
highly significant.
Intervening Circumstances
However, the time between the arrest and the consent
was sufficient for defendant herself to create a major
intervening circumstance.

This was her spontaneous search

consent offer, even over Detective Russo's initial reluctance.
See State v. Castner, 825 P.2d 699, 705 (Utah App. 1992)
(intervening circumstances found, despite short time passage
after improper stop, where the defendant "voluntarily extended
the encounter" after he was free to leave).

The trial court

found that defendant proffered her consent at least twice before
Russo accepted it (R. 106). C£. State v. Miller, 829 P.2d 132,
135 (Utah App.) (confession was admissible where record showed
that the jailed defendant may have initiated the negotiation that
produced it), cert, denied. No. 920255 (Utah Aug. 17, 1992).

She

gave her consent not only after "Miranda" warnings, but upon
further warning that she could expect no favor in return for it
(R. 106). The consent form, as in Thurman, slip op. at 24, again
apprised defendant of her right to refuse consent.
Defendant's spontaneous consent offer, plus the absence
of "flagrant" officer misconduct, thus broke the chain of
causation between her arrest and the consent.

Phrased

differently, these factors "purged" any possible "taint" of the
questioned arrest from defendant's voluntary search consent,
22

under Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 690. Thus even if the arrest might be
held improper, the fruits of the subsequent consensual search
were properly admitted into evidence.
POINT TWO
DEFENDANT'S ARREST SHOULD NOT BE HELD
UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER "PRETEXT DOCTRINE."
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed under the
attenuation analysis in Point One of this brief.

The State takes

this opportunity, however, to respond to the "pretext" argument
in defendant's opening brief.

First, the State will show that

pretext analysis, as set forth in State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040
(Utah App.), cert, granted, No. 920319 (Utah Oct. 28, 1992), does
not invalidate this otherwise-lawful arrest.

Next, the State

reviews and renews its argument for rejection—or at least close
limitation—of pretext doctrine.6
A.

Pretext Analysis Does not Invalidate this Arrest.
Consistent with its prior position, the State

acknowledges that an arrest, inherently highly intrusive, raises
more justification for adoption of pretext doctrine than does a
temporary, "level two" detention or traffic stop.

Cf.. State v.

Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 1987) (per curiam) (describing
three types of police-citizen encounters).

However, even

assuming the doctrine to be valid in the arrest context presented
here, it cannot help this defendant.
6

Besides arguing against the doctrine in Lopez, 831 P.2d at
1044, the State urged this Court to reject it in State v. Cruz, 838
P.2d 83, 84 n.l (Utah App. 1992). Both Lopez and Cruz, however,
involved temporary detentions, rather than full custodial arrests.
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1.

Subjective Intent.

Utilizing the "illegal motivation" language of Lopez,
defendant argues at length that Detective Russo's desire to
investigate her suspected drug dealing is dispositive, requiring
this Court to hold that she was "pretextually," and therefore
unconstitutionally, arrested for driving under suspension
(Opening Br. of Appellant at 13-24).

The State agrees that the

repeated reference to "illegal motivation" in Lopez appears to
invite analysis of officer subjective intent, even though the
majority opinion purports to hold otherwise.
However, in a post-Lopez opinion, issued by a panel
that included two members of the Lopez panel, this Court
clarified that subjective police "motivation" is not part of
pretext analysis.

That opinion, State v. Cruz, 838 P.2d 83 (Utah

App. 1992), states:

"The question posed in a pretext stop

analysis is whether a reasonable officer, considering the
totality of the circumstances, would have made the stop."

838

P.2d at 84 (citing Lopez. 831 P.2d at 1044; emphasis in
original).

The Court then reiterated, "Were the officer's

subjective motivation the key factor, a defendant could use this
improper motivation as an excuse to escape the consequences of an
otherwise valid and reasonable stop."

Id. (quoting Lopez, 831

P.2d at 1047).
Cruz, clarifying Lopez, thus squarely holds that
"improper" or "illegal" thoughts and motivations entertained by
police officers do not invalidate an otherwise proper detention.
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No good reason exists to hold otherwise in the context of an
arrest.

Therefore, whatever "improper" thoughts Detective Russo

entertained in arresting defendant cannot be used by her to avoid
the consequence of her otherwise valid arrest.
Quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 98 S. Ct.
1717 (1978), defendant illuminates a legitimate role for
"motivation" inquiry in assessing the validity of police behavior
under search and seizure law:

"We . . . have little doubt that

as a practical matter the judge's assessment of the motives of
the officers may occasionally influence his judgment regarding
the credibility of the officers' claims with respect to what
information was or was not available to them at the time of the
incident in question."

436 U.S. at 139 n.13, 98 S. Ct. at 1724

n.13 (emphasis added) (quoted more fully in Opening Br. of
Appellant at 22-23).
Scott thus teaches that a desire to investigate some
other offense can be very relevant in deciding whether the
assigned grounds for detaining or arresting an individual were
actually supported by observed facts.

No such credibility

problem is presented here, for defendant never challenged Russo's
assertion that he did, in fact, observe her to be driving under
suspension.

The assigned ground for arresting defendant, then,

existed beyond dispute.
2.

No "Minor Offense."

The Lopez panel stated that pretext doctrine applies
only to "minor" law violations.

Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1050 n.17
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("Only a small minority of traffic stop cases implicate the
pretext doctrine . . . " ) ; accord United States v. Guzman, 864
F.2d 1512, 1515 (10th Cir. 1988).

In Cruz, the offense of

speeding at sixty miles per hour in a residential area was held
not to be a minor violation; thus pretext analysis was
"irrelevant and inapposite" to that case,

838 P.2d at 85,

The offense of driving under suspension, for which
defendant was stopped here, is not "minor."

It is not the kind

of offense that might be committed inadvertently, as might a turn
signal problem.

Yet in State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880 (Utah

App. 1990), and State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879 (Utah App. 1989),
this Court upheld stops for turn signal problems, implicitly
deeming them "not minor."

Driving under suspension, however, is

not even an offense that, like speeding, might be committed
negligently or recklessly.
Instead, driving under suspension is a deliberate
violation of a legally-binding order to not drive an automobile.
The offense thus contains an element of willfulness that is
clearly present here, for defendant cannot plausibly allege that
she somehow forgot that her license had been suspended when she
decided to drive her automobile.

Driving under suspension

therefore cannot be a minor offense, compared to turn signal
violations, implicitly held "not minor" by this Court, or even
compared to many speeding violations.
Nor can it be seriously contended that driving under
suspension is too minor an offense to justify an arrest.
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A

rather severe sanction, license suspension results from rather
severe prior driving problems.

See Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-2-127 &

-128 (Supp. 1992) (offenses including, among others, negligent
homicide, reckless driving, and failure to prove financial
responsibility (insurance), can or may lead to suspension).

As a

matter of policy, it seems entirely proper—even preferable—to
presume that a driver whose license has been suspended presents a
danger to the public, posed by the underlying problems that led
to the suspension.

If such a person nonetheless flouts the

directive to not drive, the only recourse left, to protect the
public safety, would therefore lie in physically preventing that
person from driving.
"An officer is not required to ignore a traffic
violation because it occurs in a high-crime area."
P.2d at 883.

Smith, 781

Similarly, it is hard to imagine that Detective

Russo was required to ignore defendant's offense of driving under
suspension just because he also suspected her of another crime.
If Russo erred here, he did so by releasing defendant after
arresting her.

She should have been confined, as a presumptively

unsafe driver, to protect the public safety.

In avoiding

confinement, defendant merely received an undeserved benefit, of
which she ought not complain.
3.

"Usual Practice."

If this Court agrees that driving under suspension is
not a minor offense, pretext analysis is inappropriate under
Lopez and Cruz.

If nevertheless analyzed, the State must agree
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with defendant that while the officers in this case commonly
stopped and cited people for driving under suspension, they
arrested only a minority of such people (Opening Br. of Appellant
at 15). Thus this arrest did not, strictly speaking, amount to
"usual" practice.

It might therefore be deemed a "pretextual"

arrest, that is, one that a "reasonable officer" would not make.
See Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1048 (explaining that reasonable officer
practice may be measured by actual officer's "usual practice").
However, it does not appear that the practice of
arresting persons caught driving under suspension was so rare as
to be deemed "unusual" or otherwise wholly aberrant:

roughly

one-fourth to one-third of such offenders were arrested (R. 20506, 233). Therefore, it ought not be said that a reasonable
officer would have necessarily not arrested defendant for that
offense.

As set forth earlier, there are sound reasons to hold

that officers should arrest and confine persons caught driving
under suspension.

Accordingly, this Court should hold, if it

reaches the question at all, that this was not an improper
"pretextual" arrest, for it was not unusual for the involved
officers to make arrests for the reason assigned here.
Defendant will complain that the State is diluting the
apparent Lopez "usual practice" standard for reasonable officer
behavior, into one of "not unusual practice."

Perhaps so.

However, the Lopez majority only distinguished between offenses
for which the involved officer "routinely" detains individuals,
and those for which the officer had "never before" done so.
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831

P.2d at 1049.

The opinion therefore leaves room for a somewhat

lenient "not unusual," or even a "not unheard-of," standard by
which reasonable officer conduct, and therefore the question of
pretextual behavior, might be assessed.
The reason for adopting a relatively lenient "pretext"
standard relates to the social cost of suppressing evidence, by
subverting the truthseeking process, and in letting criminals go
free.

Quite frankly, such cost should be due only when police

officers widely deviate from usual, acceptable conduct.

Here,

based upon the evidence presented in defendant's motion to
suppress, it does not appear that Detective Russo widely deviated
from usual practice when he chose to arrest defendant, rather
than merely citing her:
had "never before" made.

this was not the type of arrest that he
The cost

of suppressing evidence,

seized as an indirect result of the arrest, therefore outweighs
the value in holding defendant accountable for the felony drug
offense, of which she is admittedly guilty.
Defendant also implies that arrests for driving under
suspension were "usual" officer practice only for detainees who
were, additionally, driving under the influence (Opening Br. of
Appellant at 15). This implication arises from defense counsel's
cross-examination of Detective Russo, who could not say how many
of his driving-under-suspension arrests also involved driving
under the influence, and of another officer who stated that of
six to seven such arrests, three or four involved driving under
the influence (R. 233, 268-69).

That cross-examination, by
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itself, says nothing about whether, as a factual matter, cocommission of driving under the influence was a controlling or
even necessary factor in the officers' decisions whether to
arrest someone caught driving under suspension.
Thus even assuming that defendant was not driving
drunk, it still does not appear that her arrest was unusual on
that basis alone.

Both under a reasonable construction of Lopez,

and under the novel theory implied by defendant, then, this
arrest was not so unusual as to be improperly "pretextual."
B.

"Pretext Doctrine" Should be Abandoned, or Greatly
Restricted in its Application.
As a final observation, the State revisits the problems

attendant to "pretext doctrine."

The doctrine's flaws exist in

its application to both temporary detentions and arrests, with at
least one court rejecting a "pretext" challenge in the latter
context.

See United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir.

1987) (en banc) (upholding bank robbery suspect's arrest on
unrelated valid warrant).

The following argument therefore

applies to both temporary detentions and arrests.

It applies to

this particular arrest even if pretext doctrine might properly
invalidate some other, highly unusual arrest for an obviously
minor offense.

Generally, the doctrine should be abandoned; at

least, it should be tightly be restricted in application.
1.

Protection under Already-Settled Law.

First, settled law already protects individuals against
unreasonable police conduct attendant to both temporary
detentions and arrests.

Only reasonable suspicion or probable
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cause permits a motor vehicle stop for a traffic offense.
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661, 663, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 140001 (1979).

Such a stop must be limited in duration and scope to

license and registration checks, a "computer check," and issuance
of a citation.
1990).

State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah App.

A non-traffic, "level two" detention must also be

supported by reasonable suspicion, and may "last no longer than
is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop."

State v.

Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 1987) (quoting authority);
accord Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.15, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1878
n.15 (1968).

In both cases, detention beyond the original

purpose is allowed only if new, articulable reasonable suspicion
arises.

Robinson, 797 P.2d at 435.7
Similarly, an arrest must be supported by probable

cause.

And even though an arrest more severely impairs its

subject's liberty, the extent of that impact is also limited by

7

Utah cases purporting to endorse pretext doctrine in the
context of temporary detentions have actually turned upon these
settled "reasonable suspicion" and "scope of detention" principles.
See State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 n.3 (Utah 1990) (invalid
traffic stop where no violation had in fact occurred); State v.
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 978 (Utah App. 1988), disavowed on other
grounds in Arroyo (same); State v. Lovearen, 798 P.2d 767, 771 n.
10 (Utah App. 1990) (stop for "following too closely" was factually
supported); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491-92 (Utah App. 1990)
(improper stop for mere avoidance of a non-emergency roadblock);
State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah App. 1990) (valid stop
for turn signal problem); State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879 (Utah App.
1989) (same); State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1217 (Utah App. 1988)
(invalid stop for registration tag that "looked funny"). Even
United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir* 1988), cited by
this Court in Sierra for its pretext analysis, involved a traffic
stop that extended, without proper cause, well beyond its initial
justification, see 864 F.2d at 1514.
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law.

The arrestee must be warned of the right to silence and the

right to counsel, under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86
S. Ct. 1602, 1612 (1966).

Any search incident to the arrest must

be limited to the area within the arrestee's immediate control,
or to areas from which hidden persons might mount an attack.

See

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S. Ct. 2034 (1969);
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 1093 (1990).

Thus

settled law already limits police conduct of both temporary
detentions and arrests.

Further individual protection, beyond

the objective standards contained within these limits, will
seldom, if ever, be necessary.
The objective limits on the conduct of an arrest were
met here.

Defendant was lawfully stopped, whereupon she was

confronted about, and admitted to, driving under suspension (R.
205-06).

Probable cause thus confirmed, defendant was arrested

and promptly given her "Miranda" warnings.

Incident to that

arrest, only the areas within defendant's immediate control were
searched, as set forth in State v. Harrison, 805 P. 2d 769, 78485 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991).

Such

treatment was both permissible and properly limited in its scope,
given the offense for which she was arrested.

Compare State v.

Parker, 834 P.2d 592 (Utah App. 1992) (gunpoint arrest and frisk
of the defendant for speeding was not proper).8
8

The full facts of Parker—recent burglaries, nonpermissive
use of an automobile, and apparent efforts to elude police—
strongly suggest that the defendant could have been properly
"stopped and frisked" as a burglary suspect. However, the Court
reasonably held that the defendant could not be arrested on these
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Thus protected by obeyed, objective limits on Russo's
conduct, defendant has no need for further "pretext" protection.
She drove an automobile, knowing that her license to do so had
been suspended, in full view of a known police officer.

She

thereby effectively, if foolishly, invited Russo to arrest her.
No sound constitutional principle demands that she be relieved of
the consequence of that invitation.
2.

Officer Intent:

the Pretext Paradox.

Besides being unnecessary, pretext doctrine, as set
forth in Lopez, creates paradoxical, self-contradictory law.

The

repeated "illegal motivation" reference in Lopez cannot refer to
objective officer behavior.

Defined by its root term, "motive,"

the word "motivation" refers to "an impulse, as an emotion,
desire, or physiological need, acting as incitement to action."
Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary 772 (1984).

But

impulses, emotions, and desires have no existence except within
the mind; even physiological needs and incitements lack meaning
until they are perceived.

Yet Lopez seemingly posits that such

subjective mental processes can, by themselves, be "illegal."
This is nonsense, yet it is defendant's argument here.
She has no argument that Detective Russo violated the objective
standards governing her arrest.

Nevertheless, defendant argues,

the arrest was illegal, solely because Russo happened to also
hold a subjective, "unconstitutional" belief that she was
involved in drug trafficking.
facts alone.
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The United States Supreme Court has squarely rejected
this argument,

"Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has

occurred turns on an objective assessment of the officer's
actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him
at the time, and not on the officer's actual state of mind at the
time the challenged action was taken."

Maryland v. Macon, 472

U.S. 463, 470-71, 105 S. Ct. 2778, 2783 (1985) (quotations and
citations omitted) (emphasis added); accord Scott v. United
States, 436 U.S. 128, 137-38, 98 S. Ct. 1717, 1723 (1978).

The

matter was explained most articulately by Justice White:
We might wish that policemen would not act
with impure plots in mind, but I do not
believe that wish a sufficient basis for
excluding, in the supposed service of the
Fourth Amendment, probative evidence obtained
by actions—if not thoughts—entirely in
accord with the Fourth Amendment and all
other constitutional requirements. In
addition, sending state and federal courts on
an expedition into the minds of police
officers would produce grave and fruitless
misallocation of judicial resources.
Massachusetts v. Painten, 389 U.S. 560, 565, 88 S. Ct. 660, 663
(1968) (White, J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari,
joined by Harlan and Stewart, JJ.).
Professor LaFave has characterized the foregoing view
as "eminently sound."
(2d Ed. 1987).

1 W. LaFave Search & Seizure, § 1.4 at 85

It is equally sound under Article I, section 14

of the Utah Constitution:

like its federal counterpart, that

provision should be deemed to protect citizens against improper
police conduct, not against correct conduct attended by "impure
thoughts" or disapproved "motivations."
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3. An Undefinable "Objective" Test.
Even redacting Lopez's paradoxical "illegal motivation"
language, as this Court apparently did in Cruz, the "objective"
pretext analysis retains an ill-defined definition of a
pretextual detention or arrest.

Under Lopez, a pretextual

detention occurs when it is found that it would not be effected
by a "reasonable officer."

Such a finding, it is said, will be

supported by a determination that the detention is outside the
particular officer's "normal practice."

831 P.2d at 1049.

However, Lopez offers no ready definition of "normal
practice."

As already set forth, even "less-than-usual" events

are not necessarily "abnormal" or "unusual."

So-called "normal"

behavior, for instance, ranges from the tediously average to the
eccentric.

Statistical deviations from "normal" values—means,

medians, and the like—are not unusual, but expected.

Thus it

cannot be said that an event that only occurs in a minority of
instances that might trigger it is necessarily "unusual."
Nevertheless, pretext doctrine, as formulated in Lopez, seems to
require police officers and reviewing courts to know when an
arrest or detention is sufficiently outside "usual" practice so
as to be improper.
Here, Russo's precise "usual" arrest rate for driving
under suspension may be unusually low compared to officers
generally.

In the trial court, defendant argued that narcotics

officers, like Russo, do not "usually" make traffic arrests, and
that when they do so, they violate the constitution (R. 155).
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However, the "reasonable officer" postulated in Lopez has not
(yet) been parsed by specialty.

Defendant's argument, however,

seemingly requires special definitions for the behavior of many
different hypothetical "reasonable officers."
The Lopez majority also suggested that in a "clear cut"
case, such as "driving eighty miles-per-hour in a school zone or
consuming alcohol while driving," pretext analysis does not
apply.

831 P.2d at 1050 n.17.

"[C]ommon knowledge suggests that

reasonable officers everywhere routinely stop such offenders."
Id.

However, "common knowledge" becomes far less useful when the

violation in question is less "clear cut," as in driving five,
ten, or fifteen miles per hour over the speed limit.

The "common

knowledge" of three different citizens, police officers, or even
appellate judges in this regard might very well differ.
Thus not even "objective" pretext doctrine provides
usable guidance to police conduct, or to trial courts who have
the front-line responsibility to review that conduct.

Case law

is little help, even on appeal—far afield from where the
decisions to detain, arrest, or disregard individuals suspected
of misbehavior are made.

In short, the "objective" pretext test

is, ultimately, highly subjective in nature.
The workable, emerging view is that a detention, so
long as authorized by law and carried out in accord with "scope"
limitations, is constitutional.9

Among the courts adopting this

9

See United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498 (8th Cir. 1990),
cert, denied,
U.S.
, 112 S. Ct. 428 (1991); United States v.
Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1989), cert, denied,
U.S.
,
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view, Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), is
particularly persuasive.

There the Texas Court of Criminal

Appeals, sitting en banc, abandoned pretext analysis, which it
had adopted five years earlier.
The Texas court found that even the "modified objective
approach" to pretext analysis, which appears identical to this
Court's Lopez approach, "in practice . . . seems at worst
unworkable and at best highly problematic . . .."
S.W.2d at 942.

Garcia, 827

It returned to the rule that a traffic stop is

valid whenever an offense is observed, "regardless of whatever
the usual practices and standards of the local law enforcement
agency are and regardless of the officer's subjective reasons for
the detention."

Ld. at 944.

Utah courts need not repeat the failed Texas experiment
with pretext doctrine.

If retained at all, the doctrine should,

again, be tightly restricted to those very rare situations where
a full arrest is made in glaring departure from well-established,
overwhelming past practice.
4.

The Utah Constitution.

Defendant asks this Court to "vitalize" the pretext
doctrine under the Utah Constitution (Opening Br. of Appellant at
112 S. Ct. 428 (1991); United States v. Causev, 834 F.2d 1179 (5th
Cir. 1987) (en banc); United States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210 (3rd
Cir.), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 833, 108 S. Ct. 110 (1987); State v.
Mease,
S.W.2d
, 52 Cr. L. 1239 (Mo. Nov. 24, 1992); Garcia
v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Scarbrouah v.
State,
So. 2d
, No. CR 90-981, 1992 WL 21025 (Ala. Crim.
App. Jan. 17, 1992) (not yet released for publication); State v.
Olaiz, 100 Or. App. 380, 786 P.2d 734, review denied, 310 Or. 12122, 794 P.2d 793 (1990).
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24).

To the contrary, proper obedience to the Utah Constitution

requires the rejection of pretext doctrine.
Dissenting in Lopez, Judge Russon noted that Motor
Vehicle Act section 41-1-17, applicable to both the Lopez
detention and this arrest, created an affirmative duty on the
part of law officers to apprehend traffic violators.

831 P.2d at

1053 (Russon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

He

then pointed out that pretext doctrine creates a separation-ofpowers problem, by asking police and courts to trump legislative
decisions, and decide for themselves which laws to follow.
at 1054.

Id.

That problem is magnified under the Utah Constitution,

which unlike its federal counterpart, spells out the separationof-powers rule:
The powers of the government of the State
of Utah shall be divided into three distinct
departments, the Legislative, the Executive,
and the Judicial; and no person charged with
the exercise of powers properly belonging to
one of these departments, shall exercise any
functions appertaining to either of the
others, except in the cases herein expressly
directed or permitted.
Utah Const. Art. V, § 1.

Pretext doctrine, as advanced by

defendant, thus amounts to a demand that this Court rewrite
section 41-1-17, eliminating its directive that officers shall
arrest traffic violators.10 Acquiescence in that demand,
however, would itself violate the Utah Constitution.

10

As set forth earlier in footnote 5, such rewriting has now
been apparently done by the legislature, but too late to strengthen
defendant's "pretext" argument here.
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5.

Reasonable Expectations.

The Lopez majority also suggested that motorists have
"reasonable expectations" against being stopped for "minor"
traffic violations.

Cf.. Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1049 n.16.

Such

expectations may be reasonable in that they are borne out by
usual experience; however, this creates no constitutional right
against such stops.
A motorist who speeds at five miles per hour over the
posted limit, for example, is merely gambling—albeit with
favorable odds—that he or she will not be stopped for the
offense.

When those odds fail, the motorist cannot complain of a

constitutional violation.

Even if the motorist subjectively

"expected" not to be stopped, such expectation does not appear to
be one that society can or should respect as constitutionally
legitimate.

Cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.

Ct. 507, 516 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (setting forth
"expectation of privacy" test).
Similarly here, it is difficult to imagine that even if
defendant subjectively expected not to be arrested for driving
under suspension, society would deem such expectation to be
reasonable.

To legitimize such expectation would give defendant

a constitutional "right" to be a scofflaw.
It appears more reasonable to expect even "minor"
scofflaws to accept occasional legal sanctions in response.
Those sanctions, and the inconvenience of being detained or
arrested to impose them are, as already set forth, limited by
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well-established, sound legal principles.

Those principles apply

equally to all "minor" offenders, including those also suspected
of some other "major" offense.

Only for the most extremely

aberrant police practice, if ever, should pretext doctrine
relieve such offenders of the consequences of their behavior.
6.

Hard Choices.

Defendant cites a number of articles by Professor
Burkoff, supporting pretext doctrine (Opening Br. of Appellant at
20-23 & nn. 4, 6). Those articles represent one side of the
debate between Professor Burkoff and Professor Haddad.

That

debate is chronicled in Butterfoss, Solving the Pretext Puzzle:
The Importance of Ulterior Motives and Fabrications in the
Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment Pretext Doctrine, 79 Ky. L. J. 1
(1990-91).

By now it should surprise neither defendant nor this

Court to learn that the State considers Professor Haddad's
arguments more persuasive.
Perhaps in the end, acceptance or rejection of pretext
doctrine represents a "hard choice," c£. Butterfoss, 79 Ky L. J.
at 11, as a policy decision, to be made by appellate courts. One
might sympathize with defendant here, given that her arrest for a
class C traffic misdemeanor has contributed to her present felony
liability.

It may seem a hard choice to let her drug conviction

stand, when pretext doctrine might free her.

However, in light

of the difficulties with that doctrine, and the distinctive
nature of the offense for which defendant was arrested, that
choice should be less hard than it seems.
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CONCLUSION
The evidence in issue here was arrived at by means that
were well attenuated from defendant's arrest; this alone defeats
her appeal.

"Pretext" analysis, even if addressed and applied

here, also does not help her.

For these reasons, defendant's

conviction for felony drug possession should be affirmed.
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